Abstract-In 2011, Khan et al. identified that Wang et al. scheme could not achieve user anonymity and had many practical pitfalls, In addition, Khan et al. presented an enhanced scheme to eliminate the aforementioned defects. In this article, we point out that Khan et al.'s scheme is incapable to provide user anonymity and suffers from forgery attack, offline password guessing attack. Besides, a new authentication scheme for anonymous users using elliptic curves cryptosystem is presented, which could withstand various types of network attacks and is more suitable for mobile application scenarios where resources constrained and security concerned.
INTRODUCTION
It is necessary for service providing servers to authenticate remote users when users access resources through public network; remote authentication is an essential mechanism for them to authenticate each other conveniently. However, a majority of the solutions are susceptible to a range of potential security attacks.
Recently, dozens of anonymous authentication schemes [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8] which emphasized the security problems were proposed. However, a majority of them were demonstrated to be insecure for the augmented reality applications.
In 2011, Khan et al. [9] proposed a remote user authentication scheme which was claimed to preserve user anonymity. However, we investigate that it is insecure. Further, user anonymity is neglected by authors. In order to conquer the aforementioned flaws, a new scheme preserving user privacy is presented. This paper is organized as follows. In section II and section III, we presented the brief review of Khan et al.'s scheme and describe the weaknesses of their scheme, respectively. In section IV, we propose an authentication scheme. The analysis of our proposal and the comparisons with other related schemes are presented in section V. At last, section VI concludes this paper.
II. OVERVIEW OF KHAN ET AL.'S SCHEME
We will present the brief review the scheme of [9] in this section.
A. Registration phase
Step1. 
III. CRYPTANALYSIS OF KHAN ET AL.'S SCHEME
We analyze the security of Khan et al.'s scheme and show their scheme is incapable to resist attacks. More over, the feature of user anonymity is not preserved in their scheme.
A. No provision of users anonymity
The user' specific and secret information (e.g., the login history and the current location) may be obtained by a malicious adversary due to the leakage of user's static identity. However, Khan et al.'s scheme [9] cannot achieve user anonymity.
Step1. Any legal but anonymous user k U can obtain the secret value y from his/her smart card.
Step2 Step3. Repeats the step 1 and 2 by replacing another guessed password until the correct password is found.
C. Forgery attack
As explained above, with the extracted values { } L y r , , 
T d′ , where k T is the fresh current time stamp and d′ is a nonce generated by k U , then, sends the forged login request message
to S . Obviously, S can accept the login request of the adversary, since these parameters of the forged login request message are in the correct format. Thus, the adversary can successfully impersonate as i U to communicate with S .
IV. OUR PROPOSED SCHEME
We propose an anonymous authentication scheme in this section. 
A. Registration phase
T is the fresh current time stamp.
Step3. After that, i
C．Authentication phase
Step1. Upon receiving { } 
C. Password changing phase
Step1. The smart card performs step 1 of the login phase.
Step2 [9] schemes is presented to evaluating our scheme. We summarize the detailed comparisons in the Table II . As you can see in Table II, our proposal is relatively more secure than the other two schemes. 
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we find out that Khan et al.'s scheme is insecure and incapable to provide user privacy. Also, we proposed a robust anonymous authentication scheme using elliptic curves cryptosystem to conquer the aforementioned weaknesses. Security analysis show that our proposal is relatively more secure than the related schemes in terms of the security.
